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I would like to start by acknowledging and thanking the Algonquin Nation, on
whose unceded territory we are meeting.
When the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867 by the UK Parliament, the
BNA Act gave the Parliament of Canada exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and
Lands reserved for the Indians”. Parliament used this authority to enact the Indian
Act in 1876. That statute gave the Canadian government the power to impose the
band council system on First Nations without their consent.
The governance authority of First Nation band councils is therefore delegated
authority – it comes from the Indian Act and applies only on reserves. Band
councils as such have no jurisdiction over First Nations’ traditional territories
beyond the boundaries of reserves.
Of course First Nations had their own governments and laws that the Canadian
government tried to replace with the Indian Act system and Canadian law.
Indigenous governance and laws existed before Europeans arrived in North
America and continued after that. They were not extinguished by colonization and
the Indian Act, but the Canadian government did attempt to repress them by
imposition of the band council system and other oppressive measures, such as
outlawing the potlatch and sun dance and establishing residential schools.
Regarding land rights, after decades of unsuccessful efforts to have their rights
respected, First Nations in British Columbia planned to go to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in England, the court of final appeal for the British
Empire. The Parliament of Canada reacted by enacting an amendment to the
Indian Act in 1927 making it illegal for anyone to raise or pay money to pursue any
Indian claims. This is how oppressive things were. But the First Nations did not
give in. In many cases they went underground and continued to practice their
governance, ceremonies, and laws.
Some of the more repressive provisions in the Indian Act were removed in 1951,
and status Indians got the right to vote in federal elections in 1960. During the
1960s, First Nations people became more organized politically, especially in
opposition to the federal government’s infamous 1969 White Paper. The Supreme
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Court of Canada also began to acknowledge Aboriginal rights and title in
important decisions, such as Calder (1973) and Guerin (1984).
But the watershed event was the inclusion of section 35 in the Constitution Act,
1982. First Nations people have always maintained that the Aboriginal and treaty
rights recognized and affirmed by this section include the inherent right of selfgovernment. During the constitutional conferences on Aboriginal and treaty rights
during the 1980s, some of the provincial governments in particular refused to
acknowledge this.
In 1995, the federal government did accept that First Nations have an inherent right
of self-government, but the government still regarded it as contingent. For it to be
implemented, negotiations had to take place and the federal and provincial
governments had to agree on its parameters.
In my opinion, this contingent approach to the inherent right is inconsistent with
section 35. I think what that section did was finally acknowledge in the Canadian
constitution that Indigenous peoples are partners in Confederation, as concluded by
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Section 35 created the
constitutional space, not only for treaty rights, land rights, resource rights, and so
on, but also for Indigenous governance.
In other words, section 35 acknowledges the constitutional authority of Indigenous
peoples to govern themselves and their territories, just as sections 91 and 92 of the
original BNA Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867) provide the federal and
provincial governments with governance authority. But unlike federal and
provincial powers, Indigenous governance authority does not come from the
Canadian constitution. The Indigenous right of self-government is inherent,
meaning that it comes from the fact that the First Nations were sovereign,
independent nations prior to European colonization. This right is not contingent – it
does not depend on or require the permission of the federal and provincial
governments in order for it to be exercised.
So how have Canadian courts dealt with the inherent right of self-government? In
my respectful opinion, in a rather confused and inadequate manner. The only case
where the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt with this matter directly is the
unfortunate Pamajewon decision in 1996. In that case, two First Nations in
Ontario claimed an Aboriginal right to govern their reserve lands, including a right
to operate and regulate gaming activities.
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I don’t want to criticize these First Nations and their legal counsel, but from a
strategic perspective a gambling case was not a good choice to take to the Supreme
Court on the inherent right of self-government. It risked setting a bad precedent,
and that is what happened because the Court was not sympathetic. It denied that
these First Nations any right of self-government over gambling.
But the real problem with Pamajewon is the way the Court reached its decision.
Chief Justice Lamer applied the Van der Peet test and said that, to have a right to
self-government over high-stakes gambling, the First Nations had to prove that
gambling, and the regulation of it, were practices, customs, and traditions integral
to their distinctive cultures at the time of contact with Europeans. This, of course,
imposes an impossible burden of proof in most cases. It is also piece-meal – each
First Nation has to meet this test for each activity it claims a right of selfgovernment over.
This is really an empty box approach to the section 35 right of self-government.
The right is acknowledged in principle, but it has no content until governance
authority over specific activities is proven on this piece-meal basis.
This approach can be compared with the approach taken by the Supreme Court of
the United States, which has acknowledged the inherent right of self-government
of the Indian nations since the 1830s. Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester v.
Georgia (1832) in particular, acknowledged that the Indigenous nations were
completely sovereign prior to European colonization.
That sovereignty continued after colonization and the creation of the United States.
According to Marshall C.J., it was diminished by European acquisition of
sovereignty, but the Indian nations retained full authority over their internal affairs
and their territories that were not surrendered by treaty or taken by conquest.
However, Indian sovereignty can be limited by Congress because it is not protected
by the US Constitution, unlike the inherent right of self-government in Canada that
has been constitutionally protected by section 35 since 1982.
The lesson to learn from the United States is that the governance authority of the
Indian nations is presumed to consist of a full box of powers, with one exception –
in external affairs, they can deal only with the United States government. They
can’t deal with foreign nations or alienate their lands to private persons.
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Apart from that exception, the starting point in the US is acknowledgement that the
Indian nations have a full range of governmental powers. So the onus of proof is
on the United States government if it contends that their right of self-government
has been diminished in some way, which could have occurred as a result of treaties
or Acts of Congress.
This is the opposite of the approach in Pamajewon, where the onus is on First
Nations to prove each of their self-government rights individually. The
Pamajewon decision has not been overruled, but I doubt that it will be followed in
future cases. It is inconsistent with Indigenous peoples’ own perspectives on their
right of self-government, which the Supreme Court has said have to be taken into
account. It is also inconsistent with the Trudeau government’s acknowledgment of
the right of self-government and its commitment to implement the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In addition, it does not take account of the
communal nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights and the need for governmental
structures to make collective decisions regarding those rights, as was held by
Justice Williamson in Campbell v. British Columbia (BCSC, 2000).
So I think the inherent right of self-government is a full box of powers that First
Nations can use to govern themselves and their lands without anyone else’s
permission. But what if this exercise of jurisdiction comes into conflict with
federal and provincial laws?
My view is that Indigenous laws in relation to their citizens and territories
generally take precedence over federal and provincial laws because Indigenous
governments and laws are protected by the constitutional space provided by section
35. In constitutional terms, this means Indigenous laws should be paramount.
However, there is an exception. The Supreme Court has said that federal and
provincial legislation can infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights – and this would
include the right of self-government – if they can justify the infringement using the
Sparrow test. Nonetheless, I think the bar for justifying infringements is quite
high. If, for example, a First Nation has its own laws regulating use of its
Aboriginal title lands in accordance with its own traditions and values, how could
the application of conflicting provincial laws be justified?
It is therefore vital for First Nations to exercise their inherent right of selfgovernment by having their own laws in place, which can include traditional laws
and new laws created through the exercise of their inherent governmental
authority. Otherwise, federal and provincial laws will likely apply by default.
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